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Loss of Consortium Claims by Unmarried
Cohabitants: The Roles of Private Self-Determination
and Public Policy
As a result of the increased incidence1 and social acceptance2 of non-
marital unions, courts throughout the country have been compelled to
reexamine these relationships and their place in the law.' Many recent
decisions have extended to unmarried cohabitants certain legal rights and
obligations previously thought to arise only as incidents of a marital
relationship." One right, traditionally associated with marriage, that un-
married cohabitants have begun to claim is the opportunity to seek
damages for loss of consortium.'
Through the concept of consortium,, the common law recognizes that
a husband and wife possess an interest in each other which is so valuable
I U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPT OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-20, No. 349, MARITAL STATUS
AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1979 at 3 (1980); Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp.
1078, 1080 (D.N.J. 1980); Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 665, 557 P.2d 106, 109, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 815, 818 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, [1981] 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2661; M. GLEN.
DON, STATE, LAW & FAMILY 78 (1977); Bruch, Property Rights of DeFacto Spouses Including
Thoughts on the Value of Homemakers' Services, 10 FAM. L.Q. 101 (1976); Clayton & Voss,
Shacking Up: Cohabitation in the 1970s, 39 J. MARR. & FAM. 273 (1977); Note, The Fearful
and Wonderful Ramifications of Marvin v. Marvin, 10 MEMPHIS ST. L. REV. 61, 61 & n.3
(1979); Note, Loss of Consortium and Unmarried Cohabitors: An Examination of Tong v.
Jocson, 14 U.S.F. L. REV. 133, 133 & n.2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Loss of
Consortium].
I See Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078, 1080 (D.N.J. 1980); Kozlowski v.
Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 385, 403 A.2d 902, 907 (1979) (quoting Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.
3d 660, 683, 557 P.2d 106, 113, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 831 (1976)); McCullon v. McCullon, 96
Misc. 2d 962, 965, 410 N.Y.S.2d 226, 228 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
1 Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078, 1080 (D.N.J. 1980). The Bulloch court noted:
"Recent years have seen a nationwide flurry of cases that have challenged the traditional
common law conception of extra-marital relations.... Similarly, the common law concep-
tion of the marital relationship has not been immune to reexamination." Id. (citations omitted).
'See generally M. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 91-96; Clark, The New Marriage, 12
WILLIAMETTE L.J. 441, 449-51 (1976).
5 Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980); Tong v. Joeson, 76 Cal. App.
3d 603, 142 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1977).
, Consortium has been understood generally as the relational interests that exist be-
tween spouses. The scope of these interests has been defined in various ways. One court
said: "'The concept of consortium includes not only loss of support or services, it also em-
braces such elements as love, companionship, affection, society, sexual relations, solace
and more'" Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 405, 525 P.2d 669, 684,
115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 780 (1974) (quoting Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d
498, 502, 239 N.E.2d 897, 899, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 308 (1968)). Another court tried to give
specific meaning to the "more" by declaring other protected interests to include "the right
to live together in the same house, to eat at the same table, and to participate together
in the activities, duties, and responsibilities necessary to make a home." Tribble v. Gregory,
288 So. 2d 13, 16 (Miss. 1974). When consortium is thus defined in functional terms, a cohabi-
tant is injured in the same way as a spouse. Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078,
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that an injury to one injures the other as well.7 To protect this relational
interest the common law provides the tort action for loss of consortium
By this action the deprived9 spouse can recover damages for a tortious °
act that renders the impaired spouse unable to provide "services, society,
and sexual intercourse.""
Until recently, a party was required to be legally married at the time
of the injury in order to recover in a consortium action.2 This traditional
requirement has been challenged in two cases by couples who were
1085 (1980). The Bulloch court stated: "It seems obvious that a member of a cohabiting
couple can suffer identical damage to that suffered by a spouse when his or her mate is
injured." Id.
I General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 367, 498 P.2d 366, 371 (1972). When consortium
is involved, a defendant's negligence "is an example of a single tortious act which harms
two people by virtue of their relationship." Id.
I E.g., Troue v. Marker, 253 Ind. 284, 252 N.E.2d 800 (1969); Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
364 Mass. 153, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973); General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 498 P.2d
366 (1972); see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS S 124, at 873-74 (4th ed. 1977).
The protection provided by the common law has changed drastically through the years.
The historical antecedent of the modern action for loss of consortium was an action for
interference with the master-servant relationship, by which action the master sued to recover
the value of the servant's lost services. Through recognition of a husband's proprietary
interest in his wife's services, the action was next extended to include compensation for
their loss. Modern courts have made two additional changes. First, they have rejected the
language involving possessory rights in the services of another and have focused instead
on the often intangible relational interests. Second, all jurisdictions that recognize claims
for loss of consortium have followed the lead of Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom. Argonne Co. v. Hitaffer, 340 U.S. 852 (1950), and allow
claims by wives as well as husbands. For summaries of the historical development of the
loss of consortium action, see Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of Am., 46 N.J. 82, 85-86,
215 A.2d 1, 3-4 (1965); W. PROSSER, supra, 5 124, at 873; Green, Protection of the Family
Under Tort Law, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 237, 239-41 (1959), reprinted in L. GREEN, THE LITIGA-
TION PROCESS IN TORT LAW 449, 451-53 (2d ed. 1977). For a listing of the states that have
recognized or rejected loss of consortium claims for spouses, see Comment, Extending Con-
sortium Rights to Unmarried Cohabitants, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 911, 917-18 nn.3740 (1981).
Since that list was compiled, Washington has recognized such claims in Lundgren v.
Whitney's, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 91, 614 P.2d 1272 (1980).
This note adopts the terminology of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 693, Com-
ment a (1977). The person who suffers the physical injury as a result of the defendant's
tortious conduct is called the impaired party. The person who suffers from the impaired
spouse's inability to provide the consortium interest is called the deprived party. Id.
o "[N]either a cohabitant nor a spouse should be compensated through a tort action
for loss of consortium when the proximate cause of the loss is not the defendant's tortious
conduct, but rather discord in the relationship or the personal preferences of the people
involved." Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078, 1088. "In order to subject a defen-
dant to liability to a deprived spouse .... all of the elements of a tort action in the im-
paired spouse must exist ...." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 693(1) & Comment e(1977). The tortious conduct can be either negligent, reckless, or intentional. See id. Com-
ment b.
" W. PROSSER, supra note 8, S 124, at 874.
" Domany v. Otis Elevator Co., 369 F.2d 604, 609 (6th Cir. 1966) (without lawful relation-
ship of marriage there can be no recovery for loss of consortium); Chiesa v. Rowe, 486
F. Supp. 236, 239 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (quoting 41 AM. JUR. 2D, Husband & Wife S 447 (1968))
(consortium "action is incident to the marriage relationship and cannot exist without it")
(emphasis by court); Angelet v. Shivar, 602 S.W.2d 185, 186 (Ky. App. 1980) ("[A] claim
for loss of consortium is directly dependent upon the marital relationship for its existence:');
[Vol. 57:605
CONSORTIUM CLAIMS
cohabiting without fulfilling the state's civil requirements for marriage."3
In 1977 the California Court of Appeal in Tong v. Jocson 4 followed the
traditional, rule and rejected a deprived cohabitant's claim for loss of con-
sortium because he was not married to his impaired partner on the date
of her injury.'5 In 1980 the federal district court for New Jersey reached
the opposite result in Bulloch v. United States."6 The district court, in a
matter of first impression under New Jersey law, 7 decided that a de-
prived cohabitant should not be barred from seeking damages for a tor-
tious act that interrupts an ongoing cohabitation relationship. 8 The court
held that "proof of a legal marriage is not an essential element of a con-
sortium claim." 9 This note proposes that the Tong decision is incorrect
and that the Bulloch decision should be followed.
The first section of this note examines the argument that permitting
loss of consortium claims by unmarried cohabitants will require recogni-
Sawyer v. Bailey, 413 A.2d 165, 166 (Me. 1980) (cause of action for loss of consortium does
not exist when injury occurred before marriage while couple was engaged to marry);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 693, Comment h (1977); see Tong v. Jocson, 76 Cal. App.
3d 603, 142 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1977). Contra, Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078, 1079
(D.N.J. 1980) ("[P]roof of a legal marriage is not an essential element of a consortium claim.").
'" Two other groups of claimants have sought the right to assert this cause of action
despite the absence of a legal marriage on the date of injury. One group comprises persons
who, although not actually married on that date, were engaged to marry and -subsequently
did marry. These claims in general have been rejected. Chiesa v. Rowe, 486 F. Supp. 236
(W.D. Mich. 1980); Sawyer v. Bailey, 413 A.2d 165 (Me. 1980). But see Sutherland v. Auch
Inter-Borough Transit Co., 366 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1973). The courts' theories for refus-
ing to allow these claims were that, because the impaired and deprived parties were not
married on the date of the impairment, the deprived party had suffered no injury, Sawyer
v. Bailey, 413 A.2d at 167, and, even if the deprived party were injured, he waived any
claim he might have had to his partner's ability to provide more or better consortium in-
terests by marrying that partner with knowledge of the impairment, Chiesa v. Rowe, 486
F. Supp. at 238. The sole exception to these holdings is Sutherland v. Auch Inter-Borough
Transit Co., which allowed the claim because the couple was engaged to be married on
the date of the injury and did in fact marry less than one month after the impairment,
366 F. Supp. at 134. The court did, however, limit the deprived plaintiff's damages to in-
clude only the period following the marriage; damages for the period between the impair-
ment and the marriage were not allowed. Id. Cf. Wagner v. International Harvester, 455
F. Supp. 168, 169 (D. Minn. 1978) (general rule making loss of consortium claims dependent
on existence of marriage may yield to special circumstances as in Sutherland; there are
no such circumstances here).
The other group of claimants who have challenged this rule comprises persons who had
no formal plans for marriage or had not even met on the date of the injury. These claims
have also been rejected. Wagner v. International Harvester, 455 F. Supp. 168 (D. Minn.
1978); Tremblay v. Carter, 390 So. 2d 816 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Angelet v. Shivar,
602 S.W.2d 185 (Ky. App. 1980) (general rule making loss of consortium claims dependent
on existence of marriage may yield to special circumstances is in Sutherland; there are
no such circumstances here).
76 Cal. App. 3d 603, 142 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1977).
Id. at 605, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980).
1 For a discussion by the Bulloch court of the role of federal courts in answering novel
questions of state law, see id. at 1082.
" Id. at 1087.
" Id. at 1079.
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tion of similar actions by a host of more remotely related claimants, thus
unreasonably extending a tortfeasor's potential liability. The second sec-
tion discusses the concern that recognizing the cohabitant's claim will
defeat the state's interest in promoting marriage. The third and fourth
sections, respectively, consider whether recognizing the cohabitant's claim
will violate public policy by resurrecting common law marriage or by
awarding speculative damages.
RECOGNIZING Loss OF CONSORTIUM CLAIMS BY UNMARRIED
COHABITANTS WILL NOT REQUIRE RECOGNITION OF
MORE REMOTE CLAIMS
Modern tort law expresses two conflicting policies: the desire to com-
pensate the innocent victims of another person's negligence2 and the
necessity of limiting a tortfeasor's responsibility for the effects of his act
to less than all its consequences.2' Limiting the scope of a tortfeasor's
liability is necessary because "[elvery injury has ramifying consequences,
like the ripplings of the waters without end."' For this reason, "[t]he prob-
lem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a con-
trollable degree."'
The court in Tong v. Jocson 4 invoked this policy of avoiding an uncon-
trollable extension of liability as the basis for refusing to recognize the
unmarried cohabitant's cause of action.' The danger the court saw was
apparently that if it were to recognize the cohabitant's claim, it would
have no basis on which to deny similar claims by "brothers, sisters, cousins,
in-laws, friends, colleagues, and other acquaintances who will be deprived
of [the impaired party's] companionship.' 6 The court in Bulloch v. United
a See, e.g., Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078, 1085 (D.N.J. 1980) (New Jersey
adheres to policy of "expanding tort liability to justly compensate those who are injured.");
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79 (1968) ("[W]e
cannot let the difficulties of adjudication frustrate the principle that there be a remedy
for every substantial wrong."); Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of Am., 46 N.J. 82, 93,
215 A.2d 1, 7 (1965) (Pertinent policy voiced in recent decisions is one of "expanding tort
liability in the just effort to afford decent compensatory measure to those injured by the
wrongful conduct of others.").
21 See, e.g., Tong v. Jocson, 76 Cal. App. 3d 603, 605, 142 Cal. Rptr. 726, 727 (1977) (quoting
Suter v. Leonard, 45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 746, 120 Cal. Rptr. 110, 111 (1975)) ("'[Nlot every
loss can be made compensable in money damages, and legal causation must terminate
somewhere.' "); Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 446, 563 P.2d 858, 861,
138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 305 (1977) ("[S]ocial policy must at some point intervene to delimit liabili-
ty:'); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 619, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 561 (1969).
Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 619, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 561 (1969).
2 Id.
76 Cal. App. 3d 603, 142 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1977).
Id. at 605, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 446, 563 P.2d 858, 862, 138 Cal. Rptr.
302, 306 (1977). The Tong opinion is very brief and consists almost entirely of quotations
from prior cases. For this reason one must refer to those cases for much of the reasoning
behind the Tong decision.
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States7 rejected that premise, noting that consortium actions by more
remote claimants need not be recognized because their relationships with
the impaired party differ from the relationship between cohabitants or
spouses.8
Three arguments, from the Bulloch opinion and elsewhere, provide possi-
ble rationales for distinguishing cohabitants' consortium claims from those
by other potential claimants. Two of these arguments-those based on
factual similarity between cohabitation and marriage and on foreseeabil-
ity-are flawed and should be rejected. The third argument, however,
which is based on the functional similarities between cohabitation and
marriage, is valid.
The Argument That Cohabitation is Factually Similar to Marriage
One rationale offered to distinguish a cohabitant's claim from that of
other potential claimants is that a cohabitant's claim is factually similar
to that of a spouse.' Two characteristics common to marriage and cohabita-
tion, but not found in the other relationships, support this rationale: the
existence of sexual activity" and the presence of only a single partner
to the relationship.
3 1
One group of potential consortium plaintiffs that has received con-
siderable judicial attention is that of minor children, 32 and the absence
of a sexual interest has been used to differentiate a child's claim from
one by a spouse.' In the course of refusing to recognize consortium claims
by minor children, the Supreme Court of California in Borer v. American
Airlines, Inc.2 said that "the spousal action for loss of consortium rests
in large part on the impairment or destruction of the sexual life of the
couple .... No similar element of damage appears in a child's suit for
2 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980).
28 Id. at 1086.
2 See Note, Loss of Consortium, supra note 1, at 143.
3 See id.
31 See Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. at 1086; Note, Loss of Consortium, supla
note 1, at 144.
- E.g., Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr.
302 (1977); Hankins v. Derby, 211 N.W.2d 581 (Iowa 1973); Russell v. Salem Transp. Co.,
61 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d 862 (1972); DeAngelis v. Lutheran Medical Center, 84 A.D.2d 17,
445 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1981). For many years courts unanimously rejected loss of consortium
claims by minor children, see Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d at 449 & n.2,
563 P.2d at 864 & n.2, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 308 & n.2; Love, Tortious Interference with the
Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an Injured Person's Society and Companionship, 51 IND.
L.J. 590, 596 & n.22 (1976). Recently, two states have chosen to recognize such claims.
The first was Massachusetts in Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., - Mass. -,
413 N.E.2d 690 (1980). Michigan followed with Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 303 N.W.2d
424 (1981).
E.g., Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 448, 563 P.2d 858, 863, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 302, 307 (1977).
-1 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977).
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loss of consortium."' ' Because cohabitants alone among potential consor-
tium claimants can experience this kind of loss, one is tempted to seize
upon that fact as the limiting rationale needed to recognize the cohabi-
•tant's claim. Such reliance would be improper, however, for two reasons.
First, the Borer court's emphasis on sexual impairment has been prop-
erly criticized as overstated." Indeed, the very opinion the Borer court
quoted for the proposition that the consortium actions rests in large part
on sexual impairment stated that the deprived spouse "is entitled to en-
joy the companionship and moral support that marriage provides no less
than its sexual side. 3 7 Second, such emphasis on sexual loss ignores the
fact that a plaintiff need not have lost all the consortium interests in order
to bring a successful suit.3 8 It is quite possible to recover damages for
loss of consortium when sexual performance is unaffected by the tort-
feasor's act.3 1
The second factual characteristic- the presence of a single spouse or
cohabiting partner - has likewise been used to differentiate spousal and
cohabitants' consortium claims from those by minor children."' The con-
cern at the heart of this distinction is the "substantial accretion of liabil-
ity against the tortfeasor"' that would arise by "adding as many com-
panion claims as the injured parent had minor children."4 The Bulloch
court, for example, allowed the cohabitant's claim on the ground that any
accretion of liability that results from recognizing his claim will be less
than that which would result from recognizing childrens' claims.4 3
Even though the presence of a single cohabiting partner provides a
means to distinguish cohabitants from other potential claimants, courts
should avoid attributing undue significance to this characteristic. While
it may be useful in limiting the tortfeasor's liability, this characteristic
Id. at 448, 563 P.2d at 863, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 307 (quoting Rodriguez v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 405, 515 P.2d 669, 684, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 780 (1974)).
See 19 Cal. 3d at 455, 563 P.2d at 868, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 312 (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(Rodriguez "reasoned that the nonsexual loss suffered by a spouse is at least as great as
the sexual loss.").
11 Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 405-06, 525 P.2d 669, 684, 115
Cal. Rptr. 765, 780 (1974).
' Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. at 1087-88 (citing Ekalo v. Constructive Serv.
Corp. of Am., 46 N.J. 82, 90, 215 A.2d 1, 5 (1965)).
' See Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d at 456, 563 P.2d at 868, 138 Cal. Rptr.
at 312 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
40 See, e.g., Borer v. American Airlines, Inc. 19 Cal. 3d at 449, 563 P.2d at 862, 138 Cal.
Rptr. at 307; Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 506, 295 A.2d 862, 864 (1972).
41 Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 506, 295 A.2d 862, 864 (1972), quoted in
Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d at 449, 563 P.2d at 863, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 309,
and in Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. at 1086.
42 Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 506, 295 A.2d 862, 864 (1972), quoted in
Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d at 449, 563 P.2d at 863, 138.Cal. Rptr. at 307,
and in Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. at 1086.
, Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. at 1086.
[Vol. 57:605
CONSORTIUM CLAIMS
provides no justification for subjecting the tortfeasor to even that one
additional claim.
The Argument That the Deprived Cohabitant's Loss is a
Foreseeable Consequence of the Tortfeasor's Act
A second rationale offered to distinguish cohabitants' consortium claims
from those of other potential claimants is that only a deprived cohabi-
tant's loss is a foreseeable consequence of the tortfeasor's act." In a famous
application of the foreseeability test in another context, the California
Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg5 formulated three factors46 to aid a court
in determining whether a particular loss is foreseeable. One of these is
"[w]hether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with
an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant
relationship." 7 The Dillon court used this factor to conclude that "[s]ure-
ly the negligent driver who causes the death of a young child may
reasonably expect that the mother will not be far distant and will upon
witnessing the accident suffer emotional trauma."48 Building upon this ap-
proach in the context of a spousal consortium claim, the same court in
R.odriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. 9 concluded that "[b]y parity of reason-
ing.., one who negligently causes a severely disabling injury to an adult
may reasonably expect that the injured person is married and that his
or her spouse will be adversely affected by that injury.""° This reasoning
has since been extended to justify recognizing consortium claims by un-
married cohabitants. Given the prevalence of and publicity about cohabita-
tion, the argument goes, one who injures an adult may reasonably expect
that the impaired party is cohabiting with another person and that the
injury will adversely affect the deprived partner."
This rationale is subject to two criticisms. First, the California Court
of Appeal has ruled in Drew v. Drake' that one cohabiting partner is
not closely related to the other for purposes of establishing foreseeability.
" See Comment, supra note 8, at 934; Note, Loss of Consortium, supra note 1, at 145-46.
'5 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
" Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The court did not decide the effect
the absence or reduced weight of any of these factors would have on foreseeability. Id.
at 741, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
47 Id.
Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974).
Id. at 399-400, 525 P.2d at 680, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
51 Comment, supra note 8, at 934-35; Note, Loss of Consortium, supra note 1, at 146;
see Drew v. Drake, 110 Cal. App. 3d 555, 559, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65, 66 (1980) (Poch6, J., dissenting).
110 Cal. App. 3d 555, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1980).
Id. at 558, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 66. This holding drew a scathing dissent, id. at 558-59,
168 Cal. Rptr. at 66-67 (PochK, J., dissenting), and as a categorical conclusion should be
rejected. But for now this holding represents a rejection of foreseeability as a limiting
rationale for a cohabitant's consortium claim.
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A much more serious fault with the foreseeability test is that it does
not exclude any of the other potential claimants. If it is foreseeable that
a party will have a spouse or cohabiting partner who will suffer from
his impairment, it must be equally foreseeable that other potential
claimants will suffer similar losses. 54 Indeed, as a test of liability,
foreseeability cannot be considered an ex ante decisional process, but
rather is an ex post justification for a result that has already been reached
by weighing the policy interests involved.5 These policy interests are ac-
counted for in the remaining rationale.
Cohabitation is Functionally Similar to Marriage
The rationale with which courts should differentiate a cohabitant's loss
of consortium claim from one by other potential claimants is that cohabita-
tion alone is functionally like marriage." This analysis looks to the in-
The exact nature of the term "closely related" has been the subject of some dispute
in the California courts. In Mobaldi v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127
Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976), a case involving an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress
brought by a foster parent who witnessed injury to the foster child, the California Court
of Appeal, Second District, implied that closeness of a relationship should be measured
in terms of "[t]he emotional attachments of the family relationship and not legal status."
Id. at 582, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 726. Then the same court, First District, held in Drew v. Drake,
a case involving an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress brought by a cohabitant
who witnessed the death of her partner, that cohabitation did not qualify as a close relation-
ship under the Dillon test of foreseeability. The court distinguished Mobaldi on the basis
of the knowledge by the defendants in Mobaldi of the close relationship between the in-
jured party and the plaintiff. The court stated: "Here, in contrast, there was no family
relationship and there was no allegation that respondents knew or should have foreseen
any other kind of relationship between appellant and the victim of the accident." Id. at
558, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d at 446, 563 P.2d at 862, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
See Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1021 (1928),
reprinted in L. GREEN, supra note 8, at 160 ("When we say in a particular case that plain-
tiff had a right, defendant was under a duty, and the like, this but means that we have
already passed judgment. We are merely using these terms to pronounce the judgment
passed:'); of. Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. at 1084 (quoting Ekalo v. Constructive
Serv. Corp. of Am., 46 N.J. 82, 95, 215 A.2d 1, 8 (1965)) ("'In the ultimate, the acceptance
or rejection of [a] consortium claim must be rested on sound policy considerations and a
proper balancing of the interests concerned.' "). Professor Green has argued:
Since liability as a matter of law is denied in so many negligence cases in
which foreseeability would impose liability, the only reasonable conclusion is
that it yields to more imperative factors. On the other hand, since there are
so many cases in which liability is imposed when there is no foreseeability,
other than is implied by a jury's verdict, it must be concluded that foreseeability
is an equally undependable basis for limiting liability.
Green, Forseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM L. REV. 1401, 1423 (1961), reprinted in
L. GREEN, supra note 8, at 305.
1 See Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. at 1086 (Children's consortium claims have
been rejected because "the relationship between parent and child is different in kind from
the relationship between spouses. Of course there are no such differences in the present
case, since Edith Bulloch alleges injuries identical to those suffered by a spouse.") (citation
omitted). See also Comment, supra note 8, at 921.
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terests that justify a spouse's consortium claim and concludes that these
same interests can also be found in a cohabitation relationship.
The Bulloch court followed this rationale because "New Jersey courts
favor a realistic view of a plaintiff's situation over abstract legal
principles."57 The court recognized the functional similarities between
cohabitation and marriage and concluded that "a person who, as a result
of tortious conduct, loses services, aid, comfort and conjugal fellowship
of the type typically shared by spouses is entitled to recover for loss of
consortium."' This statement indicates that the court was concerned with
protecting the interests arising from a special kind of relationship.
The special status of marriage in the law is clear. The Supreme Court
has said, for example, that marriage is "'the foundation of the family
and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor
progress' ,'89 and that marriage is "'fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race.' "" Through marriage society accomplishes
several important goals. Marriage allows the spouses to form a union to
which each can look for emotional support;6' it promotes a stable relation-
ship upon which a stable society can be built;" and it provides a medium
for the production and socialization of children.' A cohabitation relation-
ship can likewise further these goals.
Cohabitants Can Look to Each Other for Emotional Support
Mutual emotional support arises from the bond established between
the partners to a relationship. In the case of spouses, society looks to
their fulfillment of the state's civil requirements for marriage as a con-
, 487 F. Supp. at 1085.
Id. at 1088 (emphasis added).
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190,
211 (1888)).
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942)). Despite such statements, it has been noted that the decisions pronounced
by the Supreme Court actually display a large measure of ambivalence toward marriage.
Clark, supra note 4, at 445.
" Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485 (1965)) ("Marriage is a coming together for better or worse, hopefully endur-
ing, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way
of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commer-
cial or social projects."); M. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 325 (Marriage, as a family unit,
"is supposed to be a private place where satisfying personal relationships between husbands
and wives . . .can flourish. It is supposed to be a refuge from the psychic assaults of
society and the disappointments of the world of work."); Clark, supra note 4, at 442 ("[Tlhe
most significant function of marriage today seems to be that it furnishes emotional satisfac-
tions. For many people it is a refuge from the coldness and impersonality of contemporary
existence.").
a W. GOODE, THE FAMILY 4 (1964) ("[Ihe family is the fundamental instrumental foun-
dation of the larger social structure, in that all other institutions depend on its contribu-
tions.") (emphasis in original).
63 Id at 5; R. MORONEY, THE FAMILY & THE STATE 15 (1976); Clark, supra note 4, at 443.
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venient objective proxy for this bond. Cohabitants, by foregoing these
requirements, possess no such proxy as a marriage certificate, and occa-
sionally it is said that the absence of a formal marriage signals an absence
of a serious emotional bond." This presumption contains two errors. The
first error is that a strong emotional bond is often consistent with the
decision to cohabit. A couple may choose to cohabit rather than to marry
for a variety of reasons that do not imply the absence of commitment.
For example, the choice may be influenced by purely economic factors
such as the possible loss of pension, welfare, or tax benefits that will result
from marriage, or a lack of money to obtain a divorce from a prior spouse.'
Additionally, the choice may result from a desire for a "trial period" prior
to marriage or from a philosophic rejection of the idea that the state must
be a party to their relationship."'
Second, fulfillment of the state's requirements is not the only possible
proxy for emotional commitment. Courts can also look to such objective
factors as duration of the cohabitants' relationship, 7 the presence of
children, joint ownership of property and bank accounts, and general
reputation in the community." On the basis of such an objective analysis,
a court can legitimately conclude that "some informal relationships are
very stable and can provide ... emotional, psychological, and physical
security . ".6.."9
Cohabitation Can Serve as a Social Organizing Unit
Marriage imposes certain familial roles and responsibilities on spouses
that are conducive to order not only between the spouses but also within
the society as a whole." By encouraging the individual to assume respon-
sibilities such as producing and allocating economic goods, caring for the
sick, and promoting pro-social behavior, marriage serves a mediating role
linking the individual to the social order.7 This mediating role requires
stability, and marriage is valued as a social building block because it is
seen as an enduring union. Cohabitation, on the other hand, is occasion-
"4 See Note, Loss of Consortium, supra note 1, at 150. Se6 generally Marvin v. Marvin,
18 Cal. 3d 660, 675 n.11, 557 P.2d 106, 117 n.11, 139 Cal. Rptr. 815, 826 n.11 (1976) ("Some
couples may wish to avoid the permanent commitment that marriage implies .....
M. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 80.
See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 675 n.11, 557 P.2d 106, 117 n.11, 139 Cal. Rptr.
815, 826 n.11 (1976); M. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 79 ("In this group the legal marriage
bond is seen as an unacceptable infringement of individual liberty, or as incompatible with
the dignity of mutual ethical commitment.").
67 See Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. at 1088.
See Note, Loss of Consortium, supra note 1, at 154.
69 M. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 92 (quoting Torrance v. Torrance, [19751 1 FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) 2456 (Minn. Dist. Ct.)). See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972).
7" See W. GOODE, supra note 62, at 2.
71 Id.
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ally labeled an ephemeral relationship, 2 and thus unsuited to fulfill this
social role. This judgment is based on the perception that because
cohabitants need employ no formal procedures to terminate the relation-
ship, their relationship is more likely to dissolve than a marriage. 3
This contention contains two errors. First, it ignores the facts that free
terminability may not be an important factor in a couple's choice to
cohabit"' and that cohabitation can be a stable relationship in its own
right.75 Second, in view of the high percentage of marriages that now end
in divorce,7 the judgment that marriage is the sole domestic arrange-
ment suited for meeting the needs of society must be questioned. With
the enactment of no-fault divorce statutes 7 which utilize some variant
of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage as the basis for divorce, some
writers have concluded that a marriage is terminable on unilateral
demand.7 8 One commentator has gone so far as to say that "the concept
of permanence has been eliminated from the legal definition of marriage."79
Conversely, courts have made it increasingly difficult to terminate a
cohabitation relationship.' For these reasons courts should recognize that
a stable cohabitation relationship can adequately serve as a social building
block.
Cohabitation Can Provide a Proper Environment
for the Socialization of Children
At one time courts adhered to the rule that children should not be raised
by persons living in a cohabitation relationship. 1 This belief was prompted
I See note 64 & accompanying text supra. See generally Clayton & Voss, supra note
1, at 273.
" See Note, Loss of Consortium, supra note 1, at 150-53.
7' See note 66 & accompanying text supra.
I See text accompanying note 69 supra.
71 See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 80 (102d
ed. 1981) (in 1979 for every 1,000 population there were 10.6 marriages and 5.4 divorces);
M. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 297 n.1 (quoting American divorce statistics from [1974]
DEMOGRAPHIC Y.B. OF THE U.N., Table 13).
1 See generally Annot., 55 A.L.R. 3d 581 (1974).
,1 M. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 230 ("There is agreement among the observers that
divorce in California and the other pure no-fault states is in fact available on unilateral
demand."); Clark, supra note 4, at 444 ("In the last five years divorce has been further
liberalized in over half of the states by the enactment of statutes authorizing the termina-
tion of marriage whenever the relationship has broken down. In practice this has come
to mean that either spouse can obtain a divorce at will.").
Clark, supra note 4, at 444.
See M. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 1 ("The change [in contemporary domestic relations
law] is characterized by progressive withdrawal of legal regulation of marriage formation,
dissolution and the conduct of married life, on the one hand, and by increased regulation
of the economic and child-related consequences of formal or informal cohabitation on the
other.").
" See, e.g., Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d 337, 400 N.E.2d 421 (1979) (conclusive presump-
tion that parents' cohabitation adversely affects children), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927 (1980).
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by a judgment that cohabitation was immoral and thus threatened the
child's development.2 More recently, in cases involving custody disputes
between formerly married parents, courts have refused to presume that
cohabitation by the custodial parent is harmful to the child., One court
said that "many of us know emotionally stable adults of the opposite
sex who 'live together,' yet with whom we would gladly entrust our
children... ."' Another court forthrightly termed the fact of cohabita-
tion by a parent immaterial absent some demonstrable adverse effect on
the well-being of the child.85
Further support for the proposition that children can be properly
socialized when raised by cohabiting parents is found in the Supreme
Court's decision in Stanley v. Illinois.8 In Stanley the Court held that
upon the death of a mother a putative father, who had cohabited inter-
mittently with the mother for eighteen years and had fathered her three
children, was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before the
state could assume guardianship over his children.' The Court stated that
the law should "recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a
marriage ceremony.... [F]amflial bonds in such cases [are] often as warm,
enduring, and important as those arising within a more formally organiz-
ed family unit."88 The socialization of children thus can be accomplished
by a cohabitation relationship as well as by a marriage.
The ability of a cohabitation relationship to fulfill these societal goals
of providing an environment conducive to emotional support, social stabili-
ty, and socialization of children provides the proper rationale for courts
to recognize a cohabitant's loss of consortium claim. This ability provides
both a means for avoiding an uncontrollable extension of liabil-
ity -for these goals cannot be accomplished by any of the other potential
consortium claimants -and a persuasive argument that a cohabitant's con-
sortium interests deserve legal protection.
A cohabiting parent's "disregard for existing standards of conduct instructs her children,
by example, that they, too, may ignore [the relevant moral standards of this state] and
could well encourage the children to engage in similar activity in the future." Id. at 346-47,
400 N.E.2d at 424 (citations omitted).
"The majority approach has been to uphold visitation restrictions or custody changes
where there has been some proof that the cohabitation has affected the child." Gallo v.
Gallo, [1981] FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2499 (Conn.) (restriction permitted as to one particular
cohabiting woman; any other restriction improper as overly broad).
8 Hackley v. Hackley, [1979] 6 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.).
" Fort v. Fort, [1981] 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2750 (Mass. App.).
405 U.S. 645 (1972).
'7 Id. at 658.
Id. at 651-52.
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RECOGNIZING COHABITANTS' CONSORTIUM CLAIMS WILL NOT
DEFEAT THE STATES INTEREST IN PROMOTING MARRIAGE
Because the court in Tong v. Jocson decided its case solely on the basis
of the policy of limiting a tortfeasor's liability to a controllable degree, 0
it avoided the issue of whether a court could deny a cohabitant's loss
of consortium claim on the theory that recognition would impede the
state's interest in promoting marriage. By overcoming the extension of
liability objection, the Bulloch court was forced to decide whether allow-
ing individuals to determine privately the nature of their relationship
would defeat that state interest.9 ' The Bulloch court recognized that "[t]he
question becomes ... whether the policy in favor of marriage ... is strong
enough to prevent a cohabitant from presenting a claim for loss of con-
sortium where a spouse could."92
The state's interest in marriage is demonstrated by the traditional view
of marriage as a species of contract among three parties-the husband,
the wife, and the state.93 The state involves itself in marriage because
of the valuable social functions accomplished through marriage. Because
the state has an interest in seeing that these functions continue to be
accomplished, it has been argued that the courts should not contribute
to the popularity of a relationship that might be chosen as a substitute
for marriage.94 There are two responses to this contention.
First, the cohabitant's consortium claim does not threaten the state's
interest in promoting the continued vitality of marriage. Underlying the
argument that consoritum claims by unmarried cohabitants must be re-
jected to promote marriage is the idea that if such claims are recognized,
couples who otherwise would have married will choose instead to cohabit.
Courts from Marvin v. Marvin95 to Buloch v. United States have rejected
76 Cal. App. 3d 603, 142 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1977).
Id. at 605, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
, 487 F. Supp. at 1085.
2 Id.
See, e.g., Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 126, 42 N.W.2d 500, 501 (1950). The Fricke
court stated:
There are three parties to a marriage contract-the husband, the wife, and
the state. The husband and wife are presumed to have, and the state unques-
tionably has an interest in the maintenance of the relation which for centuries
has been recognized as a bulwark of our civilization. That unusual conditions
have caused a marked increase in the divorce rate does not require us to change
our attitude toward the marital relation and its obligation, nor should it en-
courage the growth of a tendency to treat it as a bargain made with as little
concern and dignity as is given to ordinary contract ..
Id.
94 See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 58, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207-08 (1979).
11 18 Cal. 3d 660, 684, 557 P.2d 106, 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 831 (1976). The Marvin court
stated:
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the notion that increased rights for cohabitants will adversly affect mar-
riage. The Bulloch court correctly concluded that its decision "does not
mean that the marital relationship is devalued."'98 This conclusion is re-
inforced by the recognition that regardless of increased rights for
cohabitants, considerations of tradition, family expectations, and religion
will continue to cause the vast majority of couples to choose to marry."
As the Bullock, court said: "I doubt many decide to marry because they
want to have a cause of action for loss of consortium. Deciding against
a cause of action for cohabitants, therefore, is unlikely to encourage peo-
ple to wed."98
Second, the trend in the law in recent years has been to take a neutral
position toward marital status.9 One step toward neutrality with regard
to cohabitants was taken when states decriminalized sexual intercourse
by unmarried adults.0 0 Another step came from Marvin and similar
cases,'O in which the courts held that cohabitation is a lawful relation-
ship.' Other steps have come as the law has begun to take a neutral
stance toward marital status in other areas' 03 including child custody
Lest we be misunderstood, however, we take this occasion to point out that
the structure of society itself largely depends upon the institution of mar-
riage, and nothing we have said in this opinion should be taken to derogate
from that institution. The joining of the man and the woman in marriage is
at once the most socially productive and individually fulfilling relationship that
one can enjoy' in the course of a lifetime.
Id.
487 F. Supp. at 1085-86.
See M. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 172.
487 F. Supp. at 1086.
See id. at 1080; M. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 82-83.
WO E.g., State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977) (a state statute providing
criminal sanction for fornication by unmarried adults was struck down as an inappropriate
exercise of police power and an impermissible invasion of privacy); see Glasgo v. Glasgo,
- Ind. App. - , -, 410 N.E.2d 1325, 1331 (1980) (Indiana's "most recent criminal
code does not attempt to proscribe sexual conduct between consenting adults in
private .... "); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 386, 403 A.2d 902, 907 (1979) ("[F]or-
nication is no longer designated as a crime [under New Jersey law].").
... E.g., Glasgo v. Glasgo,- Ind. App. - , 410 N.E.2d 1325 (1980); Carlson v. Olson,
256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902 (1979);
Latham v. Latham, 274 Or. 421, 547 P.2d 144 (1976).
" E.g. Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. at 1083. ("Kozlowski, then, is strong authority
for the proposition that the relationship existing between the Bullochs is a lawful one .... ").
" The emerging concept of a constitutional right to privacy may require neutrality toward
marital status. "The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a
line of decisions, however, going back as far as [1891], the Court has recognized that a
right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist
under the Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed,
found at least the roots of that right in the First Amendment .... in the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments .... in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights .... in the Ninth Amendment
.... " Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citations omitted). This right has long been
recognized as particularly applicable to matters relating to decisions about one's family
and marriage. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978). Judicial recognition of this
privacy right is not restricted to persons in a legal marriage, however. The Supreme Court
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disputes,"' entitlement to governmental benefits,'10 5 availability of credit,1"
and housing opportunities."7
These considerations do not compel recognition for an unmarried cohabi-
tant's loss or consortium claim,"8 but they do indicate a general attitude
that should guide a court confronted with such an action. This attitude
is that "the purpose of tort law is to compensate the people whose in-
juries are proximately caused by tortious conduct and that concepts of
reward or punishment related to a person's marital state are irrelevant
to a consideration of who is entitled to compensation."10 9
RECOGNIZING A COHABITANT'S CONSORTIUM CLAIM WILL
NOT RESURRECT COMMON LAW MARRIAGE
A charge made in the past when courts were asked to recognize
property claims between cohabitants, ' and which because of the Bulloch
decision is likely to resurface in connection with cohabitants' loss of con-
sortium claims, is that the recognition of such claims will resurrect com-
mon law marriage. This result would be contrary to public policy because
a large majority of states have abolished common law marriage.' Critical
differences between relationships negate this charge, however.
According. to traditional doctrine, a couple could not create a common
has recognized a privacy right in unmarried persons. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (access to contraceptives must be same for unmarried and married persons); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (unmarried woman's right to abortion). Although the Supreme
Court has not equated privacy with autonomy, see Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Pro-
tection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 590 (1977), and no court has recog-
nized a right to cohabit with which the state may not interfere, "'the outer limits of [the
right of personal privacy] have not been marked.'" Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. at 385
(quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977)).
,.. By its decision in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), "The Court said in effect
that marriage has no legal significance for the claims of parents to their children's custody:'
Clark, supra note 4, at 447.
" See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (benefits of
food stamp program may not be limited to households of related individuals); New Jersey
Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (welfare benefits only to tradi-
tional families denies equal protection to illegitimate children). Professor Clark said of these
decisions that they "may be described as holding that marriage has no legal effect on the
entitlement to state benefits." Clark, supra note 4, at 447.
11 See Note, Loss of Consortium, supra note 1, at 139.
"o See id.
,.. See Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. at 1082 (leap in logic is not self-evident).
" Id. at 1084.
Ito See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 694 n.24, 557 P.2d at 122 n.24, 134 Cal. Rptr.
at 831 n.24 (enforcement of express or implied contracts for support upon breakup of non-
marital union does not resurrect common law marriage); Glasgo v. Glasgo, - Ind. App.
- - 410 N.E.2d 1325, 1330 (1980) (same); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 387,
403 A.2d 902, -, (1980) (same). But see Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 63, 394 N.E.2d
1204, 1210 (1979) (common law marriage would be resurrected if property claims between
cohabitants were to be recognized).
.. Clark, supra note 4, at 449.
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law marriage without expressing a present mutual intent to be married."'
A cohabiting couple deliberately chooses not to be married"' and thus
lacks the intent needed for a common law marriage. This absence of in-
tent, and therefore of a common law marriage, is not merely a matter
of semantics. Rather it means that the problems that led to the abolition
of common law marriage will not accompany a cohabitant's consortium
claim.
Common law marriage is disfavored because it is "a fruitful source of
perjury and fraud."'' The possibility for perjury and fraud arises because
upon fulfilling a few simple requirements" 5 a common law spouse becomes
a legal spouse for all purposes and acquires certain rights as a result
of that status. " 6 For example, a person asserting that he was a common
law spouse of an intestate decedent can claim a share of the decedent's
estate."' Because the only other party to the relationship is unavailable
to affirm or deny this assertion, courts have little basis on which to
resolved competing claims.
There are at least two reasons such problems will not resurface if a
cohabitant's loss of consortium claim is recognized. First, a plaintiff may
not recover for loss of consortium when the impaired partner dies."8 In
such instances the plaintiff must proceed under the wrongful death
statutes."9 This fact means that a court will always be able to question
both cohabitants in a loss of consortium claim. Second, and more
importantly, a court need not convert cohabitants into spouses in order
to recognize their consortium claims."' Rather a court need only realize
that in this one area a cohabitation relationship promotes certain impor-
tant social goals and thus deserves protection similar to that given to
spouses."'
" See, e.g., In re Estate of Fisher, 176 N.W.2d 801, 805 (Iowa 1970).
113 See Clayton & Voss, supra note 1, at 273.
.. In re Wagner's Estate, 398 Pa. 531, 533, 159 A.2d 495, 497 (1960).
"' "The elements and conditions necessary to establish the existence of a common-law
marriage have been outlined by this court as: ... intent and agreement in praesenti as
to marriage on the part of both parties together with continuous cohabitation and public
declaration that they are husband and wife .... In re Estate of Fisher, 176 N.W.2d 801,
805 (Iowa 1970).
116 See M. GLENDON, supra, note 1, at 91.
... See, e.g., In re Estate of Fisher, 176 N.W.2d 801 (Iowa 1970); In re Wagner's Estate,
398 Pa. 531, 159 A.2d 495 (1960).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 693, Comment f (1977).
119 Id. Of course, this merely means that the surviving cohabitant will be subject to the
same inequity as the deprived cohabitant in a loss of consortium action if "dependents"
is read to exclude unmarried persons. Accordingly, where the surviving cohabitant can
demonstrate a stable relationship that is functionally equivalent to marriage, he should
come within the scope of his state's wrongful death statute. See Comment, supra note
8, at 931 & note 101 for jurisdictions that have extended benefits to dependent parties
in non-marital unions.
" See generally Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 682, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr.
at 830 ("We need not treat nonmarital partners as putatively married persons in order
to apply principles of implied contract, or extend equitable remedies.").
"' See notes 61-88 & accompanying text supra.
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By its own terms a cohabitant's loss of consortium claim presents only
one inherent opportunity for perjury and fraud: the possibility that the
cohabitants will collusively agree to allege the presence of the consor-
tium interests when in fact these interests do not exist. The tortfeasor
is adequately protected from such collusion, however, because the objec-
tive evidence'" to which a court will look for assurance that the consor-
tium interest exists will not be present if the cohabitants have engaged
in only a "fleeting escapade."'"8
A COHABITANT'S DAMAGE AWARD WILL NOT -BE SPECULATIVE
A loss of consortium action is intended to compensate the deprived
partner for the disruption of his right to the continued enjoyment of the
consortium interests his partner can no longer provide. '24 The amount of
compensation awarded in a successful action is computed on the an-
ticipated duration of the impaired partner's inability to make normal con-
tributions to the relationship." Thus, if the deprived cohabitant receives
such compensation and at some later time during the period covered by
the award leaves the relationship, he will have been unjustly enriched. 2 '
Presumptions about the instability of cohabitation relationships have led
some to question whether the likelihood of separation is so great for the
cohabitants that any damages that might be awarded would necessarily
be speculative."
The problem with this analysis is that it is, once again, based on
mistaken assumptions about the relative stability of cohabitation relation-
ships and marriage." Once it is recognized that cohabitation relationships
can be more stable than one might have thought and that marriages can
be less stable than one might have hoped, the deficiencies in the
speculative damages objection become apparent. To the extent that the
deprived cohabitant is a partner to a stable relationship, the objection
is overinclusive; to the extent that the deprived spouse becomes a divorce
statistic, it is underinclusive." The Bulloch court correctly concluded that
by looking at the circumstances of the cohabitants' relationship, a court
could be assured that "a verdict would be no more speculative than in
the case of man and wife. Indeed, many newly-married couples have un-
12 See text accompanying notes 67 & 68 supra.
12 Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. at 1088.
12 See notes 6, 11 & accompanying text supra.
" See Sutherland v. Auch Inter-Borough Transit Co., 366 F. Supp. 127, 134 (E.D. Pa.
1973) (Because the injury was permanent, the deprived partner recovered "for loss of past
and future consortium . . . computed on Mrs. Sutherland's 49 year life expectancy.").
' See Note, Loss of Consortium, supra note 1, at 151.
" See, e.g., id., at 150.
' See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
' See Comment, supra note 8, at 937.
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doubtedly recovered for loss of consortium under circumstances where
the factfinder had less information to base its decision upon. 130
CONCLUSION
One of the cardinal virtues of the common law is its ability to respond
to social changes, to create new rules of law, or to alter old rules as re-
quired to protect legitimate expectations.1 3 ' The traditional limitation of
loss of consortium claims to only legally married persons is a rule in need
of such change. However adequate the rule may have been in the past,
the phenomenon of cohabitation means that the circumstances that pro-
duced it have changed. Without a corresponding change in the rule, some
deserving consortium interests will continue to go unprotected. Against
this claim for protection there are no persuasive reasons, either in terms
of tort liability policies or policies relating to marriage, not to allow
cohabitants to assert the action. Courts should follow the lead of Bulloch
v. United States and redress losses of valid consortium interests whether
they occur within a marriage or within a cohabitation relationship that
is objectively determined to be the functional equivalent of marriage.
LLOYD T. WILSON, JR.
'3' Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. at 1087; accord, Note, Loss of Consortium, supra
note 1, at 151.
"' For an extended discussion of the ability, and duty, of the common law to respond
to social changes, see Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 394-98, 525 P.2d
669, 676-79, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 772-75 (1974).
[Vol. 57:605
